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This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and 
punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It 
is shown that contributions become significantly more selfish-biased as others contribute 
more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target 
player and increasing contributions by a third player. Low contributors who punish 
antisocially do not direct their punishment specifically toward high contributors, while their 
beliefs indicate that they expect to themselves be punished. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The model of voluntary contribution to a public good provides a simple metaphor for many 
social dilemmas in which cooperation is socially efficient, but where agents motivated by 
material self-interest have incentives to free-ride. In this setting, a large body of experimental 
evidence finds that while many people do indeed free-ride, there are others who contribute a 
not-inconsequential share of their resources to public goods, even in one-shot interactions.1 
A key insight from this literature is that many people are conditional cooperators, who prefer 
to contribute only when others do so, and even conditional cooperators display a “selfish bias” 
(Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001, hereinafter FGF).2 As a result, there is considerable 
interest in institutions such as peer punishment (Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002) that may 
strengthen cooperation in the face of the temptation to free-ride. Since both conditional 
cooperation and punishment are at odds with conventional theory, especially in one-shot 
settings, they have helped to stimulate a lively literature on models of social preferences.3  
The aim of this paper is to enrich understanding of how willingness to conditionally cooperate 
or punish varies in response to the cooperativeness of others. Key to this is a more complete 
application of the “strategy method” (Selten, 1967), in which each subject specifies a 
complete profile of choices in response to every possible combination of the choices of others. 
Because FGF and related studies only apply a restricted version of the strategy method based 
on the average contribution, they overlook important aspects of how conditional cooperation 
responds to the full distribution of contributions. Likewise, previous studies of punishment in 
public good experiments have not used the strategy method at all. 
                                                 
1  See Chaudhuri (2011), Gächter and Herrmann (2009), and Ledyard (1995) for excellent reviews. 
2  As Chaudhuri (2011) notes, the term “conditional cooperation” had been used in studies prior to FGF. In 
this paper I use it in the specific sense introduced by FGF, in which strategic uncertainty and beliefs over the 
contributions of others do not enter. Studies that build upon the design of FGF include Burlando and Guala 
(2005), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), Kocher et al (2008), Rustagi, Engel 
and Kosfeld (2010), Thöni, Tyran and Wengström (2010), and Volk, Thöni and Ruigrok (2012). 
3  See Cooper and Kagel (in press) for a survey of the interplay between theory and experiments in this area. 
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The results demonstrate clearly that behaviour responds not only to the average level of 
contributions – as widely presumed in the past4 – but also to the distribution of contributions 
that make up the average. This is the case both for conditional cooperation in a game without 
punishment, and for conditional punishment decisions in a game with punishment. Moreover, 
the observed effects are directionally consistent with the predictions of the Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999, hereinafter FS) model of inequality aversion. 
In the game without punishment, it is shown that there are two distinct sources of selfish bias 
in conditional cooperation. Firstly, in cases in which others contribute equally, the finding of 
FGF that even subjects classified as conditional cooperators fall short of matching others’ 
contributions is replicated. Secondly, holding the average contributions of others constant, 
conditional contributions decline even further as other players contribute more unequally. 
In the game with punishment, there is a substantial positive response of punishment to 
deviations of the target player below the contribution of the punisher, and a smaller negative 
response to deviations above the punisher. Holding the contribution of the target constant, 
punishment responds positively to the contribution of a third player. Finally, the strategy 
method also detects “antisocial” punishment of high contributors. However, contrary to the 
suggestion that this may be an expression of disdain toward “do-gooders”, there are 
remarkably few instances of antisocial punishment directed specifically at higher contributors. 
2. RELATED METHODS 
The inherent difficulty of the strategy method in public good experiments arises from the very 
large number of combinations of contributions. For the standard parameters used by Fehr and 
Gächter (2000), there are 21 integer levels of contribution from 0 to 20. With each subject 
assigned to a group of four, there are 213 = 9,261 combinations of others’ contributions. In a 
game with punishment, each subject must decide how much punishment to assign to each of 
                                                 
4  In the context of conditional cooperation, FGF and related studies elicit contributions as a function of the 
average of others’ contributions. In the context of punishment, Fehr and Gächter (2000) analyse the severity 
of punishment as a function of the deviation of the target player from the average contribution of others.  
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three others, so there are 9,261×3 = 27,783 different punishments to specify! Clearly, to make 
the strategy method operational, it is necessary to simplify the strategy space of the game. 
To apply a restricted form of the strategy method to a game without punishment, FGF elicit 
contributions conditional on the average of others’ contributions, rounded to the nearest 
integer. Thus they do not truly elicit strategies in the game-theoretic sense of responses to all 
possible actions by others. In particular, their procedure cannot detect how contributions vary 
with changes in the composition of the average. For this purpose, it is necessary to elicit 
contributions in response to combinations of contributions, and not only to averages. 
Previous studies of punishment in public good experiments rely on the “direct-response” 
method: subjects are simply asked to specify punishments in response to the actual specific 
contributions of their partners, such that the observable punishment is limited by the actual 
contributions of others. As a result, it is not possible to determine how a given punisher’s 
behaviour might differ in the face of some alternative counterfactual pattern of contributions.  
More data, and possibly greater variation in the contributions of others, can be obtained by 
pooling decisions from repeated play. However, this introduces learning effects, may bring in 
strategic considerations, and in any case need not ensure that subjects respond to a full range 
of variation in the contributions of others. In short, existing procedures only reveal specific 
instances of punishment, not the full underlying preference or willingness to punish. 
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) apply the strategy method to punishment in a one-shot 
three-person prisoners’ dilemma. However, one unusual feature of their design is that the 
“effectiveness of punishment” varies depending on whether punishment is directed toward a 
cooperator or defector. In particular, a given punishment assigned to a cooperator reduces the 
earnings of the target by more than if the same punishment were assigned to a defector. Since 
the demand for punishment is known to be responsive to this parameter,5 this could distort the 
findings regarding defectors’ willingness to punish cooperators relative to other defectors. 
                                                 
5  On this point, see Anderson and Putterman (2006), Carpenter (2007) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008). 
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3. DESIGN 
I introduce a simplified environment in which a player’s complete conditional contribution 
strategy (in a game without punishment) or punishment strategy (in a game with punishment) 
can be elicited using only ten sets of contingent decisions. The basic setting is a linear public 
good game with n = 3 players, where the marginal per capita return is a = 0.5. Each player has 
y = 6 “points” and can choose one of four contributions: c ∈ {0, 2, 4, 6}.6 Each point not 
contributed generates a private return of 1 to the individual alone. Each point contributed by 
any player returns a to every player. Since n·a > 1 > a, full contribution is socially efficient, 
whereas in a one-shot game the dominant strategy in material payoffs is to contribute 0. 
The contributions of the other two players are shown in ascending order, and subjects are only 
presented with the ten cases that are unique under this ordering, namely (0, 0), (0, 2), (0, 4), 
(0, 6), (2, 2), (2, 4), (2, 6), (4, 4), (4, 6), and (6, 6). In the game without punishment, each 
subject specifies a conditional contribution in each case. In the game with punishment, each 
subject assigns an amount of punishment, if any, to each of two other players in each case. 
3.1 The game without punishment 
The game without punishment extends the procedure introduced by FGF to allow for cases in 
which others contribute more or less equally. Each subject first makes an “unconditional” 
contribution and then completes a “contribution table” in which conditional contributions are 
specified for each of the ten cases.7 Afterwards, one player is randomly chosen to have their 
contribution determined by the contribution table, whereas for the other two the unconditional 
contribution is binding. With the contributions thus determined, the earnings of player i are: 
( )
1
n
N N N
i i j
j
y c a cπ
=
= − + ⋅
 
where the superscript N denotes the game without punishment.  
                                                 
6  Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) study the effect of restricting the size of the action set from eleven to 
two elements. They find that this results in greater cooperation when the group size is four, but not when it 
is two. This would suggest that in the present environment with three players, there may be some effect of 
restricting the action set to size four, but it is not likely to be great. 
7  Figure S1 in the electronic supplementary material depicts the decision screen for the contribution table. 
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3.2 The game with punishment 
In the game with punishment, each subject first chooses a contribution (with no contribution 
table). Each subject then assigns punishment p ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} to the other two players. Each 
unit of punishment costs one point, and reduces the earnings of the target by e = 3, however 
punishment inflicted by others cannot drive a subject’s earnings below zero.8 Afterwards, 
beliefs are also elicited regarding the punishment that subjects expect to incur from others.9 
For each of ten cases, the punishment screen displays the subject’s own actual contribution, 
the (hypothetical) contributions of the other players, and the resulting earnings of each player 
before punishment. Each case is presented on a separate screen, with “Back” and “Next” 
buttons enabling subjects to navigate between cases prior to confirming their decisions.10  
Afterwards, the computer looks up the actual contributions of the other two players to 
determine which of the ten cases is applicable. Punishment is only actually allocated for this 
case. To assign punishment to others, the computer looks up the number of points assigned by 
a subject in the applicable case. To determine the punishment assigned to a subject, the same 
is done for the other players. Given these decisions, the earnings of player i are given by: 
( )
1
max ,0
n
P P P
i i j ji ij
j j i j i
y c a c e p pπ
= ≠ ≠
   
= − + ⋅ − ⋅ −         
where P denotes the game with punishment, and pij is punishment assigned by i to j. 
                                                 
8  If a player’s earnings are driven to zero, both punishers still incur the full cost of their desired punishment. 
A subject’s earnings can still become negative as a result of the cost of punishment assigned to others. To 
allow for this, each subject is given a “starting balance” of three points at the beginning of the session. Since 
each subject plays both games, and the minimum earnings from the game without punishment are three 
points, it is thus not possible for a subject’s earnings to be negative at the conclusion of the session. 
9  Each subject can earn up to one additional earnings point depending upon the accuracy of their estimate, as 
measured by an incentive-compatible quadratic scoring rule. 
10  Figure S2 in the electronic supplementary material depicts a sample punishment screen. 
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3.3 Procedures and details of sessions 
Each subject completed both games as one-shot games in the strategy method, and the order 
of the games was counterbalanced across sessions.11 Importantly, subjects did not receive any 
feedback on the decisions of others until after they had completed both games. Accordingly, 
each subject can be treated as an independent observation in both games. Subjects were told at 
the start of the second game that they would be matched into a new group of three players, 
and that they would not be matched with any other player twice in both games. 
The experiments took place at an Australian research university in March 2010. A total of 60 
subjects took part in three “N-P” sessions in which the game without punishment was 
followed by the game with punishment. A further 63 took part in three “P-N” sessions in 
which the order was reversed.12 Earnings were converted into cash at an exchange rate of 
AUD 1.5 per earnings point. The average duration of each session was 90 minutes, and the 
average payment was AUD 28.3 (USD 26.0 or EUR 19.4). The experiment was programmed 
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).13 
4. PREDICTIONS OF THE FEHR-SCHMIDT INEQUALITY AVERSION MODEL 
A distinguishing feature of the strategy method design is that it permits examination of how 
contribution and punishment behaviours vary in response to a full range of variation in the 
contributions of others. To provide further motivation for why this information is of interest, 
in this section I briefly outline predicted responses in each of the games according to the 
standard FS model of inequality aversion. In so doing, I emphasise firstly that the FS model is 
                                                 
11  Given the one-shot design, it is essential to take care that subjects fully understand the decision problem so 
that results are not driven by confusion. Subjects were given ample time to read the instructions at their own 
pace, and ask any questions privately. Each game did not begin until all subjects correctly answered an 
extensive set of control questions; there was no time limit for subjects to complete these questions. Before 
each game, the experimenter read aloud a summary of the instructions to ensure that all payoff-relevant 
information was common knowledge. Finally, there was no time limit for subjects to enter their decisions. 
12  The electronic supplementary material contains instructions for the “N-P” order. A standard neutral framing 
was adopted, with the public good referred to as “contribution to a project”, and punishment described as the 
assignment of “deduction points”. Subjects were told they would play two games and be paid for their 
decisions in both, but were not told anything about the second game until after they had completed the first. 
13  Of the 123 subjects, 13 indicated that they knew one other subject in their session; none reported knowing 
more than one. A total of 61 subjects were females, and 14 indicated that their major was in Economics. 
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not the only one that may explain the results, and secondly that the experiment was not 
designed either as a test of its predictions or to distinguish between it and other models.14 
Rather, the point is simply that since FS utility depends upon the full vector of bilateral payoff 
comparisons, the predicted responses will vary as a function of the full set of contributions, as 
elicited under the strategy method design. That is to say, this very familiar model – which is 
well-known to be an over-simplification – suffices to predict the effect of asymmetries in 
contribution in the important and extensively-studied setting of a public good game. 
In a game with three players, the standard linear FS utility function may be written as: 
( ) ( )2 2
j i i j
i i
i i j i i jU
π π π π
α β
π π π π π
> >
= − − − −   
where αi and βi capture aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality respectively, 
and FS impose the restrictions αi ≥ βi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. Note also that in a standard linear public 
good game, either without or in the absence of punishment, the bilateral payoff difference 
between any two players is simply the negative of the difference in their contributions. 
4.1 Predictions in the game without punishment 
In the game without punishment, a subject in the role of player 1 chooses a contribution level 
given information on the contributions of players 2 and 3. Consistent with the presentation of 
the experiment, assume here that c2 ≤ c3. Each unit of contribution has three effects upon the 
FS utility of player 1: a direct decrease in 1’s earnings of (1 − a) units (where a is the 
marginal per capita return), and a decrease in 1’s earnings relative to both 2 and 3 by one unit. 
The FS model predicts that 1 will contribute up to c2 if sufficiently averse to advantageous 
inequality, or zero otherwise. In particular, in the event that c1 < c2, player 1’s FS utility is: 
( ) ( )1 11 1 2 1 3 12 2
NU c c c cβ βπ= − − − −  
                                                 
14  Both conditional cooperation and punishment are commonly interpreted as manifestations of reciprocity. 
Indeed, in the context of one-shot public good games played in the direct-response mode, Gächter and 
Herrmann (2009) equate contribution in a game without punishment with strong positive reciprocity, and 
punishment of non-contributors in a game with punishment with strong negative reciprocity. 
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which, given a = 0.5, is increasing in c1 for β1 > 0.5. However, the FS model also predicts that 
1 will never contribute in excess of c2. For example, in the event that c2 < c1 < c3, 1’s utility is: 
( ) ( )1 11 1 1 2 3 12 2
NU c c c cα βπ= − − − −  
which is strictly decreasing in c1 by the parameter restriction αi ≥ βi. That is, once c1 > c2, the 
reduction in advantageous inequality relative to 3 cannot possibly outweigh the combined 
effects of lower own earnings and increasing disadvantageous inequality relative to 2. 
Thus to summarise, in the game without punishment the FS model predicts that where others 
contribute equally, a subject who is sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality will 
contribute to the same level. However, as the others contribute unequally, the same subject 
will only match the minimum of their contributions.15 
4.2 Predictions in the game with punishment 
In the punishment stage of the game with punishment, a subject in the role of player 1 assigns 
punishments to each of the other players given information on the contributions of all players. 
In this discussion I focus on punishment of a single player, taken without loss of generality to 
be player 2, and impose no restriction on the relative contributions of players 2 and 3. Each 
unit of punishment assigned to player 2 has three effects upon the FS utility of player 1: a 
direct decrease in 1’s earnings of one unit, a net decrease in the earnings of 2 relative to 1 of 
(e − 1) units (where e is the effectiveness of punishment), and a decrease in 1’s earnings 
relative to 3 by one unit. 
The FS model predicts that there is a broader range of parameter values for which player 1 is 
willing to punish 2 when 1’s contribution falls short of 3’s than when 1 exceeds 3. However, 
irrespective of the comparison between 1 and 3, player 1 will only punish 2 down to the point 
where 2’s earnings are equated to 1’s. Let iπ denote provisional earnings of player i from the 
                                                 
15  Sugden (1984) proposes a form of reciprocity which “says, with certain qualifications, that if everyone else 
contributes a particular level of effort to the production of a public good, you must do the same” (p. 776). 
That is, there is an obligation to contribute at least the level that matches the minimum of others’ 
contributions. His “qualification” is that there is no such obligation when the level of contribution that one 
would most prefer everyone to make is less than the minimum of others’ contributions (p. 775). 
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contribution stage (i.e. before punishment), and consider first the case where c1 exceeds both 
c2 and c3. Noting that e = 3, 1’s FS utility is: 
( ) ( )1 11 1 12 1 2 12 1 3 1222 2U p c c p c c p
α α
π= − − − − − − +  
which is increasing in p12 (until 2’s earnings are equated to 1’s) for α1 > 2. Compare this to the 
case where c1 and c2 are as before, however c3 > c1. In the latter case, 1’s FS utility is: 
( ) ( )1 11 1 12 1 2 12 3 1 1222 2U p c c p c c p
α β
π= − − − − − − −  
which is increasing in p12 for α1 > 1 – β1/2. Since 0 ≤ βi < 1, punishment is utility maximising 
over a broader range of values of α1 in this latter case. The reason is that when c1 > c3 the cost 
of punishing player 2 increases player 1’s disadvantageous inequality with respect to 3, 
whereas when c3 > c1 it decreases 1’s advantageous inequality with respect to 3. By writing 
out corresponding expressions for cases in which player 2’s earnings fall below 1’s, it is 
straightforward to show that the FS model does not predict punishment in those cases.16 
Thus to summarise, in the game with punishment the FS model predicts that, subject to the 
target contributing less than the punisher, there is greater scope for punishment as the 
contribution of the third player exceeds that of the punisher. Moreover, since punishment 
ceases once the earnings of the target are equalised with those of the punisher, the severity of 
punishment will be greater the lower the contribution of the target below that of the punisher. 
5. RESULTS OF THE GAME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 
As a first step in the analysis of the game without punishment, I follow FGF in classifying 
subjects into types based on their responses in the contribution table.17 To avoid biasing the 
analysis of how conditional cooperators respond to differences in the contributions of the two 
other players, responses to unequal contributions are set aside for the purpose of this 
classification. Accordingly, define a conditional cooperator as someone whose contributions 
increase weakly monotonically over the cases (0, 0), (2, 2), (4, 4) and (6, 6); that is, if 
                                                 
16  For an exception involving punishment of multiple targets see Thöni (2011), discussed in Section 7 below. 
17  There was no evidence of any order effects: in each of ten cells in the contribution table, a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of conditional contributions is the same across 
the two treatment orders (p ≥ 0.265). Accordingly, data from both orders are pooled throughout this section. 
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c(0, 0) ≤ c(2, 2) ≤ c(4, 4) ≤ c(6, 6) with c(0, 0) < c(6, 6), where c(l, h) denotes the conditional 
contribution when the ordered contributions of the two other players are l and h. A subject 
who enters 0 in all ten cells of the contribution table is classified as a free-rider. Subjects who 
do not meet either of these criteria are classified as “others”. 
Using these definitions, 41 subjects (33 percent) are classified as conditional cooperators, 61 
(50 percent) as free-riders, and the remaining 21 (17 percent) as “others”.18,19 Thus the 
proportion of conditional cooperators is lower than the 50 percent reported by FGF in 
Switzerland but comparable with the 35 percent reported by Burlando and Guala (2005) in 
Italy. Conversely, the proportion of free-riders is higher than the 30 percent found by FGF. It 
seems likely that two factors contribute to these differences. Firstly, FGF classify some 
subjects as conditional cooperators even where their contribution schedule is not weakly 
monotonically increasing.20 Secondly, in a cross-cultural study of sixteen subject pools, 
Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter (2008, hereinafter HTG) found Australian students to be the 
least cooperative in a public good game without punishment. 
The two upper panels in Figure 1 depict the mean behaviour of subjects classified as 
conditional cooperators and “others”, respectively. Each point represents one of the ten cases 
in the contribution table. These are plotted against the implied mean contribution of the two 
other group members on the horizontal. It can be seen that the “others” conform on average to 
the “hump-shape” pattern identified by FGF. This is remarkable given that it is observed in 
responses to combinations of contributions, as opposed to averages as in FGF.21  
                                                 
18  There is no significant relationship between the proportions of subjects classified as free-riders, conditional 
contributors and “others”, and the order in which the games are played (p = 0.378, Fisher’s exact test). 
19  To examine the robustness of the definition of a conditional cooperator to the inclusion of information on 
responses to unequal contributions, consider subjects whose contributions increase weakly monotonically 
over the cases (0, 2), (2, 4) and (4, 6). There are 40 subjects who meet this condition; 34 of these are 
classified as conditional cooperators, and the remaining 6 as “others”. 
20  In FGF, the action space has 21 elements and a subject is classified as a conditional cooperator if their 
contribution schedule is weakly monotonically increasing or, failing that, the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the own and group average contributions is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
21  In particular, a “hump-shape” is clearly evident in the mean responses of “others” both in cases in which the 
two other group members contribute equally, as well as in ones in which they contribute unequally. For 
example, their mean contribution increases from (0, 2) to (2, 4), but then decreases from (2, 4) to (4, 6). 
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Recall that the standard linear FS model predicts that when others contribute equally, a 
subject who is sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality will contribute to the same level, 
or otherwise not at all. As others contribute unequally, the FS model can only explain 
contributing up to the minimum. The model can accommodate heterogeneity insofar as 
subjects differ in their aversion to inequality (and indeed, half of all subjects are insufficiently 
moved to make even a single contribution), however it cannot explain intermediate levels of 
contributions at an individual level, nor contributions in excess of the minimum. 
It is clear in Figure 1 that there is selfish bias in the behaviour of conditional cooperators, in 
that they do not on average fully match the mean contributions of others.22 Moreover, it can 
be seen that there are two distinct sources of this bias. Firstly, in the cases (2, 2), (4, 4) and 
(6, 6) in which the two other players contribute equally, conditional cooperators on average 
fail to match that contribution. In effect, this replicates the selfish bias identified by FGF; 
relative to the FS benchmark it may represent a certain amount of under-contribution.  
Secondly, there are three matched pairs of cases in which the mean of the two other players’ 
contributions are the same, but in one case they are more unequal than the other. In all three 
instances, the mean contribution of conditional cooperators is further depressed when the 
others contribute more unequally. This could not be observed in FGF since they only elicit 
responses to the average of the other players’ contributions. While this effect is directionally 
consistent with the FS benchmark, note that on all three occasions the mean contribution of 
conditional cooperators exceeds the minimum of the other players’ contributions, in clear 
violation of the model. Whereas FS predicts that subjects should only be willing to match the 
minimum, it is clear that the observed response is not as extreme as that prediction implies. 
To examine the sensitivity of these effects to the definition of a conditional cooperator, 
consider two alternative classifications. For a narrower category, define a “strong conditional 
cooperator” as a subject for whom at least two of the inequalities c(0, 0) < c(2, 2), 
c(2, 2) < c(4, 4), and c(4, 4) < c(6, 6) hold strictly, with the remaining one holding at least 
                                                 
22  Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) examine the interaction of selfish bias with type heterogeneity in a repeated 
game setting. They emphasise that selfish-biased conditional cooperation is alone sufficient to account for 
decay in contributions, and that the presence of other types is not necessary for this to obtain. 
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weakly. There are 33 subjects (27 percent) for whom this is the case. For a broader 
classification, consider all 62 subjects (50 percent) who make at least one nonzero conditional 
contribution. The lower panels in Figure 1 summarise the behaviour of these two groups. 
Naturally, compared to conditional cooperators, the contributions of the narrower group lie 
closer to the diagonal while those of the broader group lie further below it. Moreover it is also 
clear that the shapes of the functions are similar for all three classifications. 
Table 1 reports nonparametric tests of the significance of these two forms of selfish bias, both 
for conditional cooperators (in the middle column) and the two comparison groups. The top 
rows relate to cases where the two other players contribute equally. Among conditional 
cooperators the mean of c(2, 2) is 1.610, and a one-sample median test rejects the hypothesis 
that c(2, 2) = 2 with p = 0.033. Likewise, c(4, 4) and c(6, 6) differ significantly from 4 and 6 
respectively, with p < 0.001 for both. Among strong conditional cooperators it is not possible 
to reject the hypothesis that c(2, 2) = 2 (p = 0.257), while it remains the case that c(4, 4) and 
c(6, 6) differ significantly from 4 and 6 respectively (p ≤ 0.002, one-sample median tests). 
The bottom rows of Table 1 report p-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the decrease in 
contribution as the two other group members contribute more unequally, holding constant the 
mean. This decrease is found to be significant (p ≤ 0.024) for all three such comparisons, and 
in all three subject classifications. This confirms that previous designs overlook important 
information when they condition solely on the average; clearly differences in contribution 
matter a great deal as well – perhaps because they reflect the strength of a social norm or 
consensus over the appropriate level of contribution.23 This second form of selfish bias is 
most severe in the narrower subject classification and mildest in the broader one. In other 
words, subjects who condition their own contributions more strongly upon the two other 
group members, in cases where the other players contribute equally, are also more 
discouraged when the others contribute unequally.  
A limitation of the tests in Table 1 is that they do not exploit the full set of ten decisions by 
each subject, instead relying on pairwise comparisons. To provide a more complete account, 
                                                 
23  I thank one of the referees for this interpretation. 
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Table 2 reports random effects interval regressions in which each contribution decision is 
regressed on the implied mean and difference in the contributions of the two other players in 
the case that generated it, a dummy for the treatment order, and a constant.24 The regressions 
are reported for conditional cooperators (in the middle columns), as well as the two 
comparison groups. Each subject contributes ten observations to the regression, corresponding 
to the ten cases in the conditional contribution table. Table 2 also reports marginal effects for 
these regressions, conditional upon contributions lying in the interval between 0 and 6. 
The results indicate that conditional cooperators respond to a one-point increase in the mean 
contribution – holding constant the spread – by increasing their desired contribution by 0.833 
points. This response is significantly less than one (Z = −4.28, two-sided p < 0.001). On the 
other hand, they respond to a one-point increase in the spread in contributions – holding 
constant the mean – by decreasing their desired contribution by 0.136 points. This differs 
significantly from zero (p < 0.001). For strong conditional cooperators, the response to an 
increase in the mean is larger (0.921 points) but still significantly less than one (Z = −2.05, 
two-sided p = 0.040), while the response to the spread (−0.166 points, p < 0.001) is more 
negative than for conditional cooperators. For the broader comparison group, the response to 
the mean is only 0.564 points while it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that 
contributions do not respond to the difference in the other players’ contributions (p = 0.309). 
The model in Table 2, in which the other players’ contributions enter as the mean and 
difference, is equivalent to one in which the minimum and maximum contributions enter 
directly – since there are only two other players, these variables are perfectly collinear. 
Marginal effects for this specification are shown at the bottom of Table 2; note that in this 
version, the FS benchmark would predict a coefficient of one on the minimum and zero on the 
maximum. The results show that conditional cooperators respond to a one-point increase in 
the minimum– holding the maximum constant – by increasing their desired contribution by 
                                                 
24  A random effects specification is used to control for unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity in the 
propensity to contribute. An interval regression model is used on account of the discrete nature of the 
contribution space, which causes GLS or Tobit errors to be heteroskedastic. Of the four permissible 
contributions, a subject is simply modelled as choosing the one that lies closest to the “true” desired 
contribution. Thus an observed contribution of 0 is taken to imply that the desired contribution is less than 1, 
an observed contribution of 2 is taken to imply that the desired contribution lies between 1 and 3, and so on. 
15 
0.552 points. On the other hand, they respond to a one-point increase in the maximum – 
holding the minimum constant – by increasing their desired contribution by only 0.281 points. 
The null hypothesis of equality of these responses is soundly rejected with p < 0.001 in a 
Wald test; however the difference is also clearly not as sharp as the FS prediction.   
It is easy to see why conditional cooperators are more responsive to an increase in the 
minimum than they are to the maximum. While either increase has the same implied effect 
upon the mean, an increase in the minimum has the effect of decreasing the spread between 
the other players’ contributions, whereas an increase in the maximum has the opposite effect. 
Thus in the first case, the response to the decreased spread reinforces the response to the 
increased mean, whereas in the second case, the effect works in the opposite direction.25  
Finally, Table 3 summarises unconditional contributions in the game without punishment, by 
reporting the cross-tabulation of a subject’s unconditional contribution decision with the 
subject’s type as defined from the contribution table.26 The modal unconditional contribution 
is 0, and three-quarters of those who unconditionally contribute 0 are also classified as free-
riders. Among those classified as free-riders, the mean unconditional contribution is close to 
0; among conditional cooperators it is close to the midpoint of the contribution space. 
6. RESULTS OF THE GAME WITH PUNISHMENT 
Analysis of the game with punishment is complicated by evidence of order effects in both the 
level of contributions and willingness to punish, both of which are attenuated when subjects 
have previous experience of the game without punishment. In the N-P order the mean 
contribution in the game with punishment is 2.133 points, and 24 of 60 subjects (40 percent) 
assign nonzero punishment on at least one occasion. In the P-N order, the corresponding 
                                                 
25  A one-point increase in the minimum increases the mean by half a point, while decreasing the difference by 
one point. Thus according to the original model, the predicted response is 0.833/2 + 0.136 = 0.552. On the 
other hand, a one-point increase in the maximum increases the mean by half a point, while increasing the 
difference by one. Thus according to the original model, the predicted response is 0.833/2 – 0.136 = 0.281. 
For the broader comparison group consisting of all who make at least one nonzero contribution, there was 
no significant response to the difference in the other players’ contributions. Accordingly, for this group there 
is also no significant difference between the responses to the minimum and maximum. 
26  There is no significant effect of treatment order upon unconditional contributions in the game without 
punishment (p = 0.545 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test). 
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figures are 3.111 points and 37 of 63 subjects (59 percent). The difference in contributions is 
significant at p = 0.015 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, while the difference in willingness to 
punish is significant at p = 0.048 in Fisher’s exact test. Since subjects do not receive feedback 
before the end of the session, these effects cannot be attributed to learning about the 
behaviour of others (although of course some learning may take place introspectively (Weber, 
2004)). 
Nevertheless, under both orders contributions are higher when punishment is available than 
when it is not.27 Moreover, the fact that a substantial proportion of subjects are willing to 
punish may alleviate the concern that the strategy method might weaken the negative 
emotional response to defection that is thought to trigger acts of punishment (Brandts and 
Charness, 2011). In these respects, the one-shot strategy method game with punishment 
replicates key findings obtained by Fehr and Gächter (2000) in repeated games played in the 
direct response mode. 
Conditional upon willingness to punish, there little evidence of order effects in the severity of 
punishment. Among subjects who punish at least once, in all but one punishment decision, 
there is no significant order effect in the number of punishment points assigned (p ≥ 0.106 in 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests).28 For this reason, the analysis of punishment behaviour will pool 
the two orders since it is the comparative statics of punishment that are of primary interest, 
and there is little evidence that these are affected by order effects. However, this is subject to 
the caveat that the expected severity of punishment will depend upon the proportion of 
subjects who are willing to punish, and this is clearly sensitive to the treatment order. 
Recall that according to the FS model, a punisher should only punish to the point where the 
earnings of the target are equalised to those of the punisher. Further, the marginal utility of 
punishment is greater when the contribution of the third player exceeds that of the punisher. It 
                                                 
27  In the N-P order, the mean (unconditional) contribution without punishment is 1.467 points, which differs 
marginally from the game with punishment (p = 0.057 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test). In the P-N order the 
mean contribution without punishment is 1.365 points, which differs highly significantly from the game 
with punishment (p < 0.001 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
28  The exception relates to a case in which the two other players both make the full contribution of 6. In this 
case only, there is a significant difference by treatment order with p = 0.028 in a rank-sum test.  
17 
follows that in the FS framework, there is greater scope for punishment the lower is the 
contribution of the target and the greater is that of the third player. 
Figure 3 summarises punishment behaviour in the ten cases (twenty decisions) elicited by the 
strategy method. It shows the average punishment assigned, by all subjects who punish on at 
least one occasion, as a function of the contributions of the target and the third player.29 This 
reveals two clear regularities. Firstly, holding constant the contribution of the third player, 
punishment increases as the contribution of the target falls. Secondly, holding constant the 
contribution of the target, punishment increases as the contribution of the third player rises. 
Thus both of these aggregate effects are directionally consistent with the FS predictions. 
To model the punishment behaviour of those subjects who are willing to punish, while 
controlling for variables that influence the willingness to punish, Table 4 constructs a panel 
double-hurdle model of punishment. The development of this model follows that of Engel and 
Moffatt (2012), who reanalyse the effect of “house money” upon willingness to contribute in 
the public good experiment of Clark (2002).30 In this framework, the “first hurdle” determines 
whether or not a subject is of the punishing “type”, as applied to all of that subject’s decisions 
in the game with punishment.31 On the other hand, the “second hurdle” models the amount of 
punishment assigned, if any, as a function of the circumstances of each individual punishment 
decision, conditional upon the subject being a punisher. 
The first model in Table 4 is a binary probit regression in which a dummy for whether a 
subject ever punishes is modelled as a function of a dummy for the P-N order, the subject’s 
own contribution and a constant, with each subject contributing a single observation. The 
second model is a random effects interval regression, restricted to the subsample of punishers, 
in which each punishment is regressed upon the contribution of the punisher, the contribution 
                                                 
29  In the four cases where the contributions of the two other players are equal, the punishment assigned to each 
of them need not be the same. In these cases, the two sets of punishments have been pooled in the Figure. 
30  I thank Peter Moffatt for sharing STATA code from Engel and Moffatt (2012). The model reported here 
corresponds to the “basic” panel hurdle specification developed in Section 2.1 of that paper. 
31  Note that in the context of a strategy method design, it is not possible to misclassify a subject as not being of 
the punishing type simply because they never encountered a situation in which punishment would have been 
appropriate. By contrast, the contribution data in Clark (2002) were from a repeated game played in the 
direct response mode. I thank one of the anonymous referees for this observation. 
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of the third player, the absolute negative deviation in the contribution of the target below that 
of the punisher, the positive deviation of the target above the punisher, and a constant.32 Each 
punisher contributes twenty observations to this regression, corresponding to the punishment 
they assign to each of two other players in each of ten cases. These two models provide 
starting values for estimation of the corresponding portions of the full double-hurdle 
specification, which is the final model reported in Table 4. In the full model, every subject 
contributes a full set of twenty observations, regardless of whether or not they ever punish. 
The results of the first hurdle indicate that the order effect in willingness to punish operates 
through the level of contributions, which are higher under the P-N order. The contribution of 
the subject has a significant positive effect upon whether that subject ever punishes; however 
once this is controlled for there is no significant effect of the order per se. 
The results of the second hurdle indicate firstly that, conditional upon willingness to punish, 
the contribution of the punisher has a significant negative effect upon the level of punishment. 
While this may perhaps appear counterintuitive, it is accounted for by the fact that it holds the 
deviation in the contribution of the target from the punisher constant. Thus for example, it 
implies that the punishment assigned to a target who contributes at the same level as the 
punisher diminishes as the contributions of both increase. 
Negative deviations in the contribution of the target below that of the punisher have a 
significant positive effect upon punishment, while positive deviations in the contribution of 
the target above that of the punisher have a significant negative effect – albeit one that is 
substantially smaller in magnitude than the response to negative deviations. This asymmetry 
in the response to positive and negative deviations is confirmed by a Wald test, in which the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on absolute negative and positive deviations are equal 
(but opposite in sign) is soundly rejected, with p < 0.001. 
                                                 
32  As before, interval regression is used on account of the discrete nature of the punishment space. Of the four 
permissible punishments, a subject is again simply modelled as choosing the one that lies closest to the 
“true” desired punishment. The interval specification is also carried through to the full double-hurdle model, 
and in this respect the framework of Engel and Moffatt (2012) is generalised. 
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Finally, for a given contribution of the punisher and deviation in the contribution of the target 
from that of the punisher, the results confirm a significant positive effect of increasing 
contributions by the third player upon the severity of punishment assigned to the target. 
Because Figure 2 pools the decisions of all punishers, it masks any differences associated with 
the contribution of the punisher. Figure 3 displays the average punishment functions 
separately for punishers who contribute 0, 2, 4, and 6. To allow for possible differences in the 
slopes of these functions, Table 5 reports an enlarged version of the model in Table 4 in 
which the contribution of the third player and the absolute negative and positive deviations of 
the target are interacted with dummies for each level of contribution of the punisher. 
The results in Table 5 largely confirm those of Table 4, with some qualifications. Firstly, the 
response to the contribution of the third player is positive and significant at every contribution 
level of the punisher. However, the null hypothesis that these coefficients are equal is rejected 
with marginal significance (p = 0.073). The absolute negative deviation of the target below 
the punisher always has a sizable and significant positive effect on punishment; moreover the 
null hypothesis that this effect does not differ with the contribution of the punisher cannot be 
rejected (p = 0.644). These two directional predictions of the FS model are thus confirmed at 
all levels of contribution by the punisher. Among those who contribute 0, is there is a 
significant negative response to positive deviations of the target above the punisher.33 
However for punishers who contribute 2 or 4, the responses to positive deviations are not 
significant. Accordingly, for this effect the null hypothesis of equal slopes is rejected 
(p = 0.041). 
7. ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT 
The preceding analysis highlights several related observations. Firstly, subjects who behave 
selfishly by contributing 0 do not necessarily refrain from punishing others. Conversely, those 
who make the maximum contribution do not necessarily escape punishment. Thus the strategy 
method detects “antisocial punishment”. Following HTG, define antisocial punishment as any 
                                                 
33 Of course, the FS model cannot account for any punishment by zero contributors. The issue of “antisocial 
punishment” is addressed at greater length in the next section. 
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nonzero punishment of a target who contributes at least as much as the punisher,34 with the 
effect of increasing the advantageous earnings differential of the punisher over a target whose 
earnings before punishment were already weakly lower. Any nonzero punishment by a subject 
who contributes 0 is thus by definition antisocial, and conversely, the greater a subject’s own 
contribution, the fewer of that subject’s punishment decisions are potentially antisocial. 
Since HTG find that antisocial punishment varies considerably across cultures, the motivation 
behind it may also vary and therefore the findings from any single subject pool can never be 
definitive. Nonetheless, the results of the present study generally do not support the conjecture 
that antisocial punishment is targeted specifically toward high contributors, as implied by the 
hypothesis of “do-gooder derogation” (Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman 2006, p. 268; 
HTG, p. 1366; Monin 2007). If anything, the results indicate that antisocial punishment 
decreases as the contribution of the target rises.35  
More definitive evidence can be found through direct examination of the data. In total, there 
are 567 nonzero punishments assigned in 375 decision cases by 61 subjects (out of 123). 
However, there are only 7 decision cases (involving 3 punishers) in which a target who 
contributes strictly more than the third player is assigned strictly greater punishment than the 
third player. Likewise, there are only 5 cases (involving 2 punishers) in which the strictly 
highest contributor is the sole target of punishment. These findings indicate that the singling 
out of high contributors for antisocial punishment is a relatively rare occurrence. 
Thöni (2011) identifies theoretical conditions in which antisocial punishment may be 
motivated by inequality aversion. These relate to cases where a punisher wishes to target a 
low contributor, but fears that a high-contributing third player may be unwilling to join in 
punishing the low contributor. In this case, the punisher may elect to punish both other 
players. Here, the motive for punishing the high contributor is to avoid falling behind that 
                                                 
34  Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2006) use the term “perverse punishment” to refer to punishment of an 
above-average contributor. Clearly, these concepts overlap considerably. 
35  HTG (p. 1366) in fact obtain the same result in the majority of their subject pools. They interpret it to 
suggest that “some antisocial punishment may be efficiency-enhancing in intent”, although they do not 
acknowledge that it appears to be at odds with their hypothesis of “do-gooder derogation”. In Fehr and 
Gächter (2000, p. 991) the effect is negative but not statistically significant. However, Ones and Putterman 
(2007, p. 506) report a significant positive response to positive deviations in two of their three treatments. 
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player’s earnings on account of their unwillingness to share in the cost of punishment. 
However, Thöni examines data from several studies including Fehr and Gächter (2002) and 
HTG, and finds that most antisocial punishments are not compatible with this hypothesis. 
The data in the present study can also be examined for evidence of Thöni’s inequality 
aversion hypothesis. In this context, an advantage of the strategy method is that it ensures that 
every subject is exposed to the full set of potentially antisocial punishment opportunities. As a 
precondition for the punishment envisaged by Thöni, it is necessary that there be both a 
strictly lower contributor who is the “true” target of punishment as well as a weakly higher-
contributing “bystander” who is antisocially punished to avoid falling behind that player’s 
earnings. The data contain 280 decision cases involving 83 subjects (all those who do not 
contribute 0) in which a punisher is faced with both a strictly lower and a weakly higher 
contributing group member. In 154 cases neither player is punished, while in 102 cases only 
the lower contributor is punished. There are 3 cases (involving 1 punisher) in which only the 
weakly higher contributor is antisocially punished, inconsistent with Thöni’s hypothesis. 
Behaviour potentially compatible with Thöni’s hypothesis is found in 21 decision cases 
(involving 10 punishers) in which both a strictly lower and weakly higher contributor are 
punished. However, examining the other punishment decisions of these same 10 subjects casts 
doubt on this interpretation. In particular, there are 17 cases (involving 6 of these 10 
punishers) in which these subjects assign nonzero punishment even when they are the weakly 
lowest contributor. Here, Thöni’s hypothesis does not provide any rationale for punishment. 
Recall that subjects’ beliefs were also elicited regarding the amount of punishment they 
expect to incur from others. These beliefs are summarised in Table 6. The results are broken 
down by the subject’s own contribution, whether or not the subject ever punishes, and 
whether or not the subject ever punishes antisocially. Two broad facts are evident from this 
analysis. Firstly, subjects who punish expect to incur more punishment from others than those 
who do not. Secondly, among subjects who punish, those who sometimes punish antisocially 
also expect to incur more punishment than those who do not. Both effects are highly 
significant in Wilcoxon rank-sum tests when the data are pooled over all levels of 
contribution of the punisher (p ≤ 0.004). 
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Subjects who contribute 0 are of particular interest since for them all punishments are by 
definition antisocial. Subjects who contribute 0, but do not punish, expect on average to incur 
1 punishment point. On the other hand, subjects who contribute 0 and who punish expect on 
average to incur 2.9 punishment points.36 This difference is highly significant, with p = 0.002 
in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. This result is compatible with pre-emptive retaliation against 
anticipated punishment from others as one explanation for antisocial punishment (although it 
could also be attributable to self-serving beliefs or a “false consensus” effect). 
8. CONCLUSION 
Through the systematic application of the strategy method, this paper makes several new 
contributions to understanding behaviour in voluntary contribution experiments both without 
and with punishment. A unifying theme is that both conditional cooperation and punishment 
respond not only to the average level of others’ contributions, as widely presumed in the past, 
but also to independent variation in the individual contributions that make up that average. 
Moreover, the directions of the observed effects are consistent with the predictions of the FS 
model of inequality aversion, at least at an aggregate level. These effects could not be 
observed in previous studies of conditional cooperation that employed restricted versions of 
the strategy method, or in previous studies of punishment in public good experiments that 
relied upon the direct-response mode of elicitation. Finally, the data also contribute to our 
understanding of the motives for antisocial punishment. 
At the same time, it is appropriate to acknowledge some potential qualifications and open 
questions. Firstly, this paper has not pursued the possibility of differences in responses 
elicited under the strategy and direct-response methods (Brandts and Charness, 2011), instead 
focusing on the comparative statics revealed within a strategy method design. However this 
leaves open the possibility that there may be a difference in levels, and this may matter 
importantly in certain applications (for example Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010) where data 
from the strategy method are used to shed light upon the dynamics of behaviour in repeated 
games played under direct response. Moreover, whereas the strategy method for contributions 
                                                 
36  Overall, the mean realised punishment incurred by those who contributed 0 was 0.925 points (s.d. = 1.366). 
23 
– in the restricted form conditional on averages as pioneered by FGF – has been thoroughly 
validated by a decade of subsequent research, this is not the case for the application to 
punishment. Indeed, Brandts and Charness identify punishment as one domain in which they 
suspect the strategy method to have an effect, with levels of punishment tending to be lower 
than under direct response. Finally, to permit a full application of the strategy method it was 
necessary to simplify the decision environment by reducing both the number of players and 
size of the action space, and this may inhibit the comparability of the results to those obtained 
under more familiar designs. Unfortunately, this would appear to be unavoidable, given that a 
full application of the strategy method in the standard environment (comprising four players 
and 21 actions) is clearly intractable. 
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Figure 1. Mean conditional contributions as a function of combinations of the other two 
players’ contributions, for alternative classifications of subjects’ contribution behaviour. The 
horizontal axis depicts the mean of the other two players’ contributions. The diagonal 
corresponds to perfect conditional cooperation. 
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Figure 2. Mean punishment behaviour of subjects who assign at least one non-zero 
punishment, as a function of the contributions of the target player and third player. 
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Figure 3. Mean punishment behaviour of subjects who assign at least one non-zero 
punishment, as a function of the contributions of the punisher, target player, and third player. 
The contribution of the punisher is the actual amount contributed by a subject; the 
contributions of the target and third player are systematically varied over the ten cases in the 
experiment. 
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Table 1. Tests of two sources of selfish bias in conditional contributions. 
 
Strong 
conditional
cooperators
Conditional 
cooperators 
All non-zero 
contributors 
Mean of c(2,2) 1.818 1.610 1.419 
One-sample median test p-value: c(2,2) = 2 0.257 0.033 0.000 
Mean of c(4,4) 3.394 3.024 2.387 
One-sample median test p-value: c(4,4) = 4 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Mean of c(6,6) 5.273 4.829 3.323 
One-sample median test p-value: c(6,6) = 6 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Mean of c(0,4) 1.091 1.024 0.935 
Mean of c(2,2) 1.818 1.610 1.419 
Signed-rank p-value: c(0,4) = c(2,2) 0.005 0.005 0.003 
Mean of c(0,6) 1.515 1.415 1.484 
Mean of c(2,4) 2.485 2.195 1.935 
Signed-rank p-value: c(0,6) = c(2,4) 0.001 0.002 0.011 
Mean of c(2,6) 2.727 2.488 2.032 
Mean of c(4,4) 3.394 3.024 2.387 
Signed-rank p-value: c(2,6) = c(4,4) 0.004 0.007 0.024 
Number of subjects 33 41 62 
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Table 2. Random effects interval regressions of conditional contributions. 
  Strong conditional cooperators Conditional cooperators All non-zero contributors 
  Coef SE p Coef SE p Coef SE p 
Mean of the other two players’ contributions 0.941 0.040 0.000 0.907 0.039 0.000 0.751 0.046 0.000 
Difference between the others’ contributions -0.169 0.029 0.000 -0.148 0.028 0.000 -0.035 0.034 0.308 
Order (equals one for P-N sessions) 0.171 0.280 0.541 0.580 0.358 0.105 0.364 0.352 0.301 
Constant -0.374 0.253 0.140 -0.766 0.286 0.007 -1.037 0.305 0.001 
sigma_u 0.733 0.110 0.000 1.079 0.138 0.000 1.267 0.141 0.000 
sigma_e 0.781 0.058 0.000 0.832 0.055 0.000 1.378 0.064 0.000 
Number of subjects 33 41 62 
Number of observations 330 410 620 
Left censored observations 99 143 280 
Interval observations 202 235 305 
Right censored observations 29 32 35 
Log likelihood -223.384 -287.764 -560.825 
Marginal effects dy/dx SE p dy/dx SE p dy/dx SE p 
Mean of the other two players’ contributions 0.921 0.038 0.000 0.833 0.039 0.000 0.564 0.038 0.000 
Difference between the others’ contributions -0.166 0.028 0.000 -0.136 0.026 0.000 -0.026 0.026 0.309 
Marginal effects dy/dx SE p dy/dx SE p dy/dx SE p 
Minimum of the other players’ contributions 0.626 0.033 0.000 0.552 0.032 0.000 0.308 0.031 0.000 
Maximum of the other players’ contributions 0.295 0.035 0.000 0.281 0.033 0.000 0.256 0.033 0.000 
p-value: minimum = maximum 0.000 0.000 0.308 
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Table 3. Cross-tabulation of unconditional contributions (cu) by conditional contribution types 
in the game without punishment. 
  Free-riders Conditional cooperators Others Total 
cu = 0 52 8 9 69 
cu = 2 5 15 8 28 
cu = 4 4 11 4 19 
cu = 6 0 7 0 7 
Total 61 41 21 123 
Mean of cu 0.426 2.829 1.524 1.415 
32 
Table 4. Regression analyses of punishment behaviour. 
 Probit Panel Interval (punishers only) 
Panel Hurdle 
(all subjects) 
Coef SE p Coef SE p Coef SE p 
First hurdle: Willingness to punish          
Order (equals one for P-N sessions) 0.336 0.238 0.157    0.260 0.358 0.468
Contribution of the subject 0.169 0.054 0.002    0.454 0.169 0.007
Constant -0.630 0.207 0.002    -0.677 0.252 0.007
Second hurdle: Punishment behaviour          
Contribution of the punisher    -0.354 0.065 0.000 -0.630 0.059 0.000
Contribution of the third player    0.109 0.012 0.000 0.110 0.012 0.000
Absolute negative deviation of target from punisher    0.360 0.020 0.000 0.357 0.021 0.000
Positive deviation of target from punisher    -0.069 0.020 0.000 -0.072 0.020 0.000
Constant    0.918 0.255 0.000 1.418 0.166 0.000
sigma_u    0.995 0.103 0.000 1.538 0.134 0.000
sigma_e    0.640 0.026 0.000 0.647 0.026 0.000
p-value: negative deviation + positive deviation = 0  0.000 0.000 
Number of subjects 123 61 123 
Number of observations 123 1220 2460 
Left censored observations  653 1893 
Interval observations  465 465 
Right censored observations  102 102 
Log likelihood -78.013 -855.831 -917.496 
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Table 5. Regression analyses of punishment behaviour, where coefficients may vary with the 
contribution of the punisher. 
 Panel Interval(punishers only) 
Panel Hurdle
(all subjects) 
Coef SE p Coef SE p 
First hurdle: Willingness to punish       
Order (equals one for P-N sessions)    0.273 0.381 0.474 
Contribution of the subject    0.518 0.208 0.013 
Constant    -0.665 0.267 0.013 
Second hurdle: Punishment behaviour       
Contribution of the punisher -0.385 0.070 0.000 -0.597 0.060 0.000 
c = 0: Contribution of the third player 0.099 0.026 0.000 0.096 0.027 0.000 
c = 0: Positive deviation of target from punisher -0.114 0.026 0.000 -0.124 0.027 0.000 
c = 2: Contribution of the third player 0.149 0.023 0.000 0.159 0.024 0.000 
c = 2: Absolute negative deviation of target from punisher 0.289 0.064 0.000 0.322 0.066 0.000 
c = 2: Positive deviation of target from punisher -0.055 0.037 0.134 -0.039 0.037 0.294 
c = 4: Contribution of the third player 0.077 0.020 0.000 0.074 0.022 0.001 
c = 4: Absolute negative deviation of target from punisher 0.365 0.033 0.000 0.359 0.038 0.000 
c = 4: Positive deviation of target from punisher 0.036 0.070 0.609 0.030 0.075 0.684 
c = 6: Contribution of the third player 0.116 0.022 0.000 0.116 0.024 0.000 
c = 6: Absolute negative deviation of target from punisher 0.388 0.027 0.000 0.383 0.029 0.000 
Constant 1.014 0.268 0.000 1.104 0.205 0.000 
sigma_u 1.007 0.105 0.000 1.532 0.144 0.000 
sigma_e 0.628 0.026 0.000 0.635 0.026 0.000 
p-value: c = 2, negative deviation + positive deviation = 0 0.008 0.002 
p-value: c = 4, negative deviation + positive deviation = 0 0.000 0.000 
p-value: equal responses to third player 0.115 0.073 
p-value: equal responses to negative deviations 0.349 0.644 
p-value: equal responses to positive deviations 0.088 0.041 
Number of subjects 61 123 
Number of observations 1220 2460 
Left censored observations 653 1893 
Interval observations 465 465 
Right censored observations 102 102 
Log likelihood -847.642 -908.424 
34 
Table 6. Mean beliefs regarding punishment incurred in the game with punishment (numbers 
in parentheses represent numbers of observations). 
  Own contribution All 
subjects  c = 0 c = 2 c = 4 c = 6 
Never punish 1.00 0.92 1.33 0.50 0.98 
(30) (12) (12) (8) (62) 
Punish 2.90 2.06 1.32 1.38 1.79 
(10) (16) (19) (16) (61) 
Rank-sum p-value: Punish vs. never 0.002 0.057 0.766 0.323 0.004 
Punish, never antisocial 
  1.00 0.82 0.67 0.78 
(4) (11) (12) (27) 
Punish, sometimes antisocial 2.90 2.42 2.00 3.50 2.59 
(10) (12) (8) (4) (34) 
Rank-sum p-value: Antisocial vs. never   0.152 0.037 0.006 0.000 
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ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL – NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
Figure S1. Decision screen for the contribution table of the strategy method game without 
punishment. 
 
Figure S2. Sample decision screen showing one of the ten cases in the punishment stage of the 
strategy method game with punishment. 
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ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL – NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE N-P TREATMENT ORDER 
Horizontal rules denote the positions of page breaks in the original instructions.  
Control questions were displayed on screen. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Welcome to today’s session. In this session we will conduct two experiments on economic 
decision making. These experiments are simple, and if you read the instructions carefully and 
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. 
It is strictly prohibited to communicate with the other participants. If you violate this rule, you 
will be dismissed from the lab and forfeit all earnings. If you have any questions please raise 
your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
In each of the two experiments, we will proceed through the following steps: 
• Firstly, you will be given information about the decision situation for the experiment. 
• You will then be asked to answer some questions at your computer to check that you 
fully understand the decision situation. 
• Next, you will be given further instructions on how to use the computer screens to enter 
your decisions. 
• Finally, you will enter your decisions into the computer. 
At the end of the second experiment you will be given information about the results of your 
decisions in both experiments. After this, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. 
Throughout the session, your earnings will be calculated in “points”. At the end of the 
session, the total number of points you have earned will be converted into Australian Dollars 
and paid to you in cash. You will be paid for your decisions in both experiments. 
The conversion rate will be 1 point = 1.5 Australian Dollars. 
At the beginning of the session, you will have a starting balance of three points. This is in 
addition to the other points that you earn throughout the session. 
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FIRST EXPERIMENT: DECISION SITUATION 
In this experiment, you will be in a group of three players, consisting of yourself and two 
others. All decisions will be made anonymously, and you will never learn the identity of the 
other two players in your group. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be given six points. (This is in addition to your 
starting balance of three points.) You have to decide how many of these six points you want to 
contribute to a project, and how many to retain for yourself. 
You can choose to contribute 0, 2, 4, or 6 points to the project. 
Each point that you do not contribute to the project will be automatically retained for yourself. 
The other two players will face the same decision situation. 
Your earnings from this decision 
Your earnings will depend on both your own decision, and the decisions of the other two 
players in your group. These earnings consist of two parts: 
1. Your earnings from the points you retain for yourself: 
Your earnings from points you retain for yourself = 6 − Your contribution. 
No-one other than you earns anything from the points you retain for yourself. 
2. Your earnings from the project. This is calculated as: 
Your earnings from the project = 0.5 × Sum of all three players’ contributions. 
All three players receive the same earnings from the project. For each point that anyone 
contributes to the project, the total earnings of the group therefore increase by 1.5 points. 
Your contribution to the project thus increases the earnings of the other two players. At 
the same time, you also receive earnings as a result of the other players’ contributions. 
Your total earnings are the sum of the points you retained and your earnings from the project: 
Your earnings = (6 − Your contribution) + (0.5 × Sum of all three players’ contributions) 
The earnings of the other two players are calculated in the same manner. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Please answer the following questions. These serve to check your understanding of the 
decision situation and earnings calculations. When everyone has completed all the questions 
correctly, we will explain how the experiment itself will take place. 
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If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
1. Suppose that no-one contributes anything to the project. 
a. What are your earnings in points? 
b. What are the earnings of each of the other two players? 
2. Suppose that all three players each contribute 6 points to the project. 
a. What are your earnings in points? 
b. What are the earnings of each of the other two players? 
3. Suppose that you contribute 0 points, and the other two players each contribute 6 points. 
a. What are your earnings in points? 
b. What are the earnings of each of the other two players? 
4. Suppose that the other two players contribute a total of 8 points to the project. 
a. What are your earnings if you contribute 2 points? 
b. What are your earnings if you contribute 4 points? 
5. Suppose that you contribute 4 points to the project. 
a. What are your earnings if the other two players contribute a total of 4 points? 
b. What are your earnings if the other two players contribute a total of 8 points? 
                                                                                                                                                        
FIRST EXPERIMENT: PROCEDURES 
This experiment will take place only once. You will complete three tasks: an “unconditional” 
contribution, a “contribution table”, and your prediction of the contributions of the other 
participants in the laboratory. 
Unconditional contribution 
In the “unconditional” contribution decision, you simply indicate how many points you want 
to contribute to the project. You can contribute 0, 2, 4, or 6 points. You enter your decision by 
typing one of these numbers in the input field on your screen: 
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After you enter the amount you want to contribute, you must click the OK button. As long as 
you have not clicked OK, you can still change your decision. After you have clicked OK, your 
decision can no longer be revised. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Contribution table 
In the “contribution table”, you indicate how many points you want to contribute to the 
project for every possible combination of the contributions of the other two players in your 
group. There are ten possible combinations, as you can see from the decision screen: 
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For each of the ten cases, you can choose to contribute 0, 2, 4, or 6 points to the project. You 
must make an entry in each of the ten input boxes. Once you have finished, please click OK. 
Afterwards, the computer will randomly determine whether your unconditional contribution 
or your contribution table will be used to decide your earnings: 
• For two of the three players in your group, the unconditional contribution will be used 
to decide that player’s contribution to the project.  
• For the third player, the contribution table will be used. The computer will first look up 
the unconditional contributions of the first two players. It will then choose the 
appropriate contribution from the third player’s contribution table. 
Your earnings will then be computed in the manner that was explained earlier: 
Your earnings = (6 − Your contribution) + (0.5 × Sum of all three players’ contributions) 
Since you do not know, at the time you make your decisions, whether your unconditional 
contribution or your contribution table will be used to decide your earnings, you should treat 
both sets of decisions as if they would count for your earnings. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prediction of the other participants’ contributions 
You can earn additional points by predicting the unconditional contributions of the other 
participants in the laboratory. In particular, you will be asked in how many cases out of 100 
you think the other participants contributed 0, 2, 4, and 6 points: 
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For each of the four contribution levels you should enter a number between zero and 100. 
These numbers must add up exactly to 100. Afterwards, the computer will compare your 
predictions to the actual unconditional contributions of the other participants in the laboratory.  
You can earn up to two extra earnings points for your predictions. The closer your predictions 
are to the actual percentage of participants who chose each contribution level, the more you 
earn. You cannot lose points from making predictions; it is only possible to earn more points. 
The formula that determines your earnings from your predictions is as follows: 
2 2 2 2
2
100 100 100 100
A a B b C c D dEarnings from predictions − − − −       = − − − −                
where: 
A = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 0,     a = Your prediction of A, 
B = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 2,     b = Your prediction of B, 
C = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 4,     c = Your prediction of C, 
D = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 6,     d = Your prediction of D. 
                                                                                                                                                        
SECOND EXPERIMENT: DECISION SITUATION 
We will now conduct a new experiment, in which there are some changes. You will complete 
this second experiment before you learn the results from the first experiment. After this, you 
will learn the results from both experiments and there will be no further experiments. 
In this new experiment, you will be in a new group of three players, consisting of yourself and 
two others. Your new group will not include either of the players you were grouped with in 
the first experiment. Again, you will never learn the identity of the other two players.  
The new experiment consists of two stages. 
Stage one 
Stage one is identical to the unconditional contribution in the first experiment. At the 
beginning of this stage you will again be given six points. You have to decide how many of 
these six points you want to contribute to a project, and how many to retain for yourself. 
You can choose to contribute 0, 2, 4, or 6 points to the project. 
Each point that you do not contribute to the project will be automatically retained for yourself. 
You will only make an unconditional contribution decision – there is no contribution table. 
Your earnings from stage one will be computed in the same manner as in the first experiment: 
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( ) ( )6 0.5Earnings from Your contribution Sum of all three players  contributionsstage one ′= − + ×  
Stage two 
Stage two is new to this experiment. In this stage you can assign deduction points to reduce 
the earnings of one or both of the other players, or you can leave their earnings unchanged. 
The other players can also assign deduction points to reduce your earnings if they so wish. 
You can assign 0, 1, 2, or 3 deduction points to each of the other two players. 
If you assign deduction points to another player, each deduction point will reduce the 
earnings of that player by three earnings points. If you do not assign any deduction points to 
a player, then that player’s earnings will be unchanged. 
For each deduction point that you assign to another player, you will incur a cost of one 
earnings point. If you do not assign any deduction points, you will not incur any costs. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Your earnings from these decisions 
Your final earnings in this experiment will depend on your earnings from stage one, the 
number of deduction points you received from the other two players in your group, and the 
number of deduction points you assigned to them. 
In particular, the computer will first take the number of deduction points (if any) you received 
from the other two players, and multiply this by three. 
• If this amount (three times the number of deduction points you received) is no greater 
than your earnings from stage one, then your earnings will be reduced by this amount. 
• Otherwise, if this amount is greater than your earnings from stage one, your earnings 
will be reduced to zero. Notice that this means that the deduction points you receive 
from the other players cannot cause you to suffer a loss.  
After it has done this, the computer will then deduct the cost of any deduction points you 
assigned to the other two players. Notice that this means that you must always incur the cost 
of any deduction points you assign to the other players, even if this causes you to suffer a loss. 
If your final earnings are negative, the loss will be taken out of the starting balance that you 
were given at the beginning of the session. Notice, however, that it is always possible to avoid 
such a loss for certain through your own decisions. 
The earnings of the other two players will be calculated in the same manner. 
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Please answer the following questions. These serve to check your understanding of the 
decision situation and earnings calculations. When everyone has completed all the questions 
correctly, we will explain how the experiment itself will take place. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
6. Suppose that you assign 3 deduction points to the second player and 0 deduction points 
to the third player. 
a. What cost do you incur to assign these deduction points? 
b. By how much will the earnings of the second player be reduced? 
c. By how much will the earnings of the third player be reduced? 
7. By how much will your earnings be reduced: 
a. If you receive a total of 1 deduction points from the other players? 
b. If you receive a total of 2 deduction points from the other players? 
                                                                                                                                                        
SECOND EXPERIMENT: PROCEDURES 
This experiment takes place only once. You will complete four tasks: a contribution in stage 
one, a set of ten “cases” to assign deduction points in stage two, your prediction of the other 
participants’ contributions, and your prediction of the number of deduction points you receive. 
Stage one contribution 
In the contribution decision in stage one, you indicate how many points you want to 
contribute to the project. You can contribute 0, 2, 4, or 6 points. 
In this experiment you only make an unconditional contribution decision – there is no 
contribution table. This means that the amount you enter in the contribution screen will for 
certain be your contribution to the project. 
Stage two deduction cases 
In the second task, you indicate how many deduction points, if any, you want to assign to 
each of the other two players.  
When you assign deduction points, you will not know the actual contributions of the other 
two players. Instead, you will assign deduction points for ten cases, corresponding to all ten 
possible combinations of the other two players’ contributions. 
Of the two other players in your group, we refer to the one who contributes less to the project 
as “Player B”, and the one who contributes more as “Player C”. Then the ten cases are: 
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 Player B’s contribution
Player C’s 
contribution
Case 1 0 0 
Case 2 0 2 
Case 3 0 4 
Case 4 0 6 
Case 5 2 2 
Case 6 2 4 
Case 7 2 6 
Case 8 4 4 
Case 9 4 6 
Case 10 6 6 
                                                                                                                                                        
You can assign up to three deduction points to each player in each of the ten cases. These 
deduction points will only actually be allocated for one of the ten cases. This is the case that 
corresponds to the actual contributions of the other two players. 
For each case, you will complete a decision screen similar to the one shown for Case 1: 
 
In each of the ten cases, your own contribution is always the amount you chose in stage one. 
In the actual experiment, each decision screen will show your own contribution in the first 
column, and you will also be able to see the earnings from stage one for each of the players. 
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For each of the cases, you must decide how many deduction points, if any, you want to assign 
to Player B and Player C. You must enter a number for each of the players. If you do not wish 
to reduce the earnings of a player, then you must enter “0”. 
You can use the “Next” and “Back” buttons to move between the ten cases. The “OK” button 
appears after you have filled in all ten cases. As long as you have not clicked “OK”, you can 
change any of your decisions. After you click “OK”, your decisions can no longer be revised. 
Afterwards, the computer will look up the stage one contributions of the other two players in 
your group. From this, it will determine which of the ten cases is the relevant one and use 
your decisions from that case to assign deduction points to the other two players. 
The computer will also do the same for the two other players in your group. In this way it will 
determine how many deduction points, if any, you receive from each of the other players. 
Your earnings will then be computed in the manner that was explained previously. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prediction of the other participants’ contributions 
You can again earn additional points by predicting the contributions of the other participants 
in the laboratory. As before, you will be asked in how many cases out of 100 you think the 
other participants contributed 0, 2, 4, and 6 points in the second experiment. 
For each of the four contribution levels you should enter a number between zero and 100. 
These numbers must add up exactly to 100. Afterwards, the computer will compare your 
predictions to the actual contributions of the other participants in the laboratory.  
You can earn up to two extra earnings points for your predictions. The closer your predictions 
are to the actual percentage of participants who chose each contribution level, the more you 
earn. You cannot lose points from making predictions; it is only possible to earn more points. 
The formula that determines your earnings from your predictions is the same as before: 
2 2 2 2
2
100 100 100 100
A a B b C c D dEarnings from predictions − − − −       = − − − −                
where: 
A = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 0,     a = Your prediction of A, 
B = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 2,     b = Your prediction of B, 
C = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 4,     c = Your prediction of C, 
D = Percentage of the other participants who contribute 6,     d = Your prediction of D. 
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Prediction of deduction points received 
Finally, you will be asked to predict the total number of deduction points assigned to you by the 
other two players in your group. This must be a number between zero and six. Afterwards, the 
computer will compare your prediction to the actual number of deduction points you received. 
You can earn up to one extra earnings point for your prediction. The closer your prediction is 
to the total number of deduction points the other players assigned to you, the more you earn. 
You cannot lose points from making predictions; it is only possible to earn more points. 
The formula that determines your earnings from your prediction is as follows: 
2
1
6
X xEarnings from prediction − = −     
where X is the actual number of deduction points you received, and x is your prediction of X. 
